ABSTRACT As the world's population gradually enters the aging stage, the smart healthcare demand has become extremely urgent and incomparably important. Healthcare wireless sensor networks (HWSNs) is one of the foundations of smart healthcare. Medical information is extremely sensitive information. However, HWSNs uses a common communication channel and is vulnerable to various types of security attacks. Therefore, ensuring the communication and data security of HWSNs and protecting patient privacy are the basis of smart healthcare. After analyzing the deficiencies of a certificateless aggregation signature scheme for HWSNs, an improved certificateless aggregation signature scheme (called iCLAS) is proposed in this paper. We present rigorous security proof that shows iCLAS can resist all kinds of security attacks and can ensure patient privacy protection. The detailed performance comparisons show iCLAS has clear advantages in computation and communication cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of network technologies, many services by using wireless communication methods, such as 4G/5G, WiFi, ZigBee, and Bluetooth, have been popularly used in various fields around daily life [1] . People expect these services to bring a significant improvement for people's living conditions, especially advanced telemedicine and telemonitoring are more urgent and significant in the age of aging. World Health Organization (WHO) predicts that human life expectancy will rise to 75 years in 2030, and approximately 80 million people will be 60 years old in America while 430 million in China by 2050 [2] . It is wellknown that the huge number of old people will pose great economic and social challenges in daily and illness care for the elderly.
In order to care for the elderly better and reduce the social burden, smart healthcare is becoming more and more important, the demand for smart healthcare is increasing. Real-time monitoring of patients and clinical diagnosis of telemedicine has become an important part of the smart healthcare system [3] . To meet the healthcare requirements of the aging population, governments have developed a serial of new policies to construct a comprehensive healthcare wireless sensor networks (HWSNs) by using advanced wireless communication technologies under cloud computing environment [4] . Their main method is to combine information technologies, such as wireless network and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID), with medical industry to meet the growing needs of older people in medical-related services. In HWSNs, patient-related information, such as blood information, heart rate, and respiratory data, can be uploaded to the telemedicine monitoring system through RFID and other communication technologies, and timely feedback to the designed doctors to achieve real-time monitoring and treatment goals. Smart wheelchairs, rural healthcare insurance, and mobile healthcare insurance are gradually widely used, which is a great development for aging society. The typical medical services based HWSNs can be illustrated as Fig.1 .
How to protect personal privacy, especially personal health information, is a topic of greatest concern in a modern society with developed information technology [5] . Patient privacy includes information about the patient's previous medical history when a patient receives medical services, as well as other intimate information, such as private life, psychological defects, reproductive history, family history, personal sexual orientation, and sexual life. As we all know, personal health information is extremely concealed to individuals. For entrepreneurs or celebrities, it may bring a chain reaction such as major political or economic changes. However, in recent years, it has been common that patients' health information have been maliciously attacked and stolen. Such as the data storage record of Patient Home Monitoring was suspected of being stolen, nearly 47 GB of medical data was leaked and privacy information such as names, addresses, doctors and case records of nearly 150,000 patients are awkward; The medical data of a well-known plastic surgery hospital in London was eavesdropped through the Internet, where the leaked medical information contained members of the British royal family; In 2018, more than 700 million citizen medical information of an official medical service information system was leaked, and more than 80 million citizen information was sold. Therefore, HWSNs involved in medical systems such as home healthcare, remote diagnosis and treatment, smart medical and precision medical care should be paid great attention to the data security and privacy protection issues.
However, there are many security and privacy issues in HWSNs applications. Because patients' health information, such as blood pressure, heart rate, other health conditions and emergencies, are transferred among patient, doctors and cloud server over the public network. Any improper or inadvertent disclosure may infringe on patients' privacy or even cause user property loss. As health information is stored in a health-cloud server, patients may also be concerned that their critical privacy health data may be lost, compromised, or tampered with because the health-cloud server is not fully trusted. It is also worth noting that some malicious attackers have adopted some misconduct in HWSNs, which easily destroys the preferences of other users or misleads the preferences of other users. Without proper security and privacy protection for the case, users may not be able to enjoy secure services and will not accept and satisfy HWSNs services.
To solve the security and privacy issues of HWSNs, many scholars have put a lot of efforts and put forward many secure schemes, one of the important ways is to encrypt data and make a signature. PKI-based or identity-based signature schemes have been adopted in early secure schemes for HWSNs, but it has caused heavy certificate management or key escrow issues. In order to eliminate such issues, certificateless signature technology is applied to HWSNs and has a good application prospect. In 2017, Kumar et al. proposed a CLAS for HWSNs to protect patients' privacy and keep data secure against all kinds of security attacks. Unfortunately, Kumar et al.' s cannot be secure against forge attack and provide privacy protection as demonstrated in this paper Section 5. As far as we know, there is little universally accepted efficient and secure signature scheme for HWSNs, especially based on certificateless signature schemes. Due to the high specification privacy protection requirements and the node's limited computing power, it is a great challenge to construct a secure and efficient certificateless signature scheme for HWSNs.
A. MOTIVATIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we review Kumar et al.'s CLAS scheme [6] that proposed most recently and demonstrate the deficiencies of their scheme. Next, aimed to decrease the energy consumption and ensure data secure during data transmission, an improved CLAS scheme is proposed by using Elliptic curve cryptography (EEC). The proposed scheme can achieve data protection, user authentication and signature aggregation by combining multiple signatures that signed on health data into one single short aggregate signature. Hence, the proposed scheme not only could protect data protection, but also can decrease communication cost and storage cost for HWSNs. In summary, the proposed scheme has four major contributions as follows.
First, we present a typical system model for HWSNs with signature aggregation function. The data aggregator can authenticate health data from users and aggregate them into one message before sending them to the medical server, as shown in Fig. 2 .
Second, we present an improved certificateless-based aggregate signature scheme (called iCLAS) by using elliptic curve cryptosystem, which has an efficient message signing algorithm, signature verification algorithm and aggregation algorithm.
Third, based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem under random oracle model, a rigorous security proof is shown that the iCLAS can resist all kinds of security attacks and ensure patient privacy protection.
Fourth, the detailed performance comparisons between the proposed iCLAS and Kumar et al.'s CLAS scheme [6] show that iCLAS has clear advantages in computation and communication cost. 
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest is arranged as follows. Sect. 2 presents the related works. Sect. 3 introduces the preliminaries and Sect. 4 gives the system model and security requirement. Sect. 5 reviews and analyzes Kumar et al.'s CLAS scheme. Next, the iCLAS is proposed in Sect. 6. The next two sections present security proof and performance comparisons. At last, conclusion and future work are drawn.
II. RELATED WORKS
The issues about security and privacy in the healthcare wireless sensor networks (HWSNs) should be paid close attentions because the patient's personal health data are quite sensitive information than other private information. The health information are transferred from sensor devices to the healthcare center, then doctors can analyze these information and provide right solution for the patient. However, the information are transferred via unsecure public channel, and easily suffer from eavesdropping, interception, modification, and other security attacks. As we all know, modification attack may result in misleading doctors to make wrong diagnosis, which may be extremely dangerous for the human life.
To achieve a secure communication among healthcare wireless sensors, access points (such as mobile phones, personal digital assistance) and healthcare severs, public key cryptography (PKC) are used in HWSNs [7] - [9] . But establishment and management of public key infrastructure have many difficulties during its implementation. To avoid this problem, researchers introduce identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) for HWSN [10] , [11] . Nevertheless no digital certificate used in IBC can easily erase the difficulties in public key infrastructure, once the key generation center (KGC) is compromised, key escrow problem will be a very serious security problem.
Al Riyami and Pterson [12] introduced the certificateless cryptography in 2003 to solve the key escrow problem of identity-based public key cryptography. After this pioneer work [12] , many researchers have presented many security solutions [13] , [14] based on certificateless cryptography in recent years. Soon later, Huang et al. [15] presented an improved certificateless signature scheme to avoid the security leaks in [12] . Huang et al. [14] presented two certificateless signature scheme based on security of three new kinds of adversaries. Unfortunately, Shim [16] Recently, researchers have proposed plenty of aggregate signature schemes for wireless sensor networks [18] - [20] . Some researchers proposed aggregate signatures schemes by using bilinear pairing according to the complexity and computational efforts of pairing [21] - [23] . Xiong et al. [24] presented an aggregate signature scheme without clock synchronization and needing less pairing operations than Zhang et al. [21] proposed scheme. However, Xiong et al.'s scheme [24] is secure against to forgery attack [25] , [26] . Wen et al. [27] used bilinear pairings to construct an aggregate signature scheme based on specified verifier. Hartung et al. [28] proposed a new fault-tolerant aggregate signature scheme by fixed number of messages in one aggregate signature. Tu et al. [23] presented an improved aggregate signature scheme to overcome the security leaks of Xiong et al.'s scheme [24] . He et al. [29] proposed a certificateless public auditing scheme for cloud-assisted wireless body area network. To achieve secure communication for HWSN, many other type architectures [30] have been proposed in recently years. However, it is a pity that the above mentioned schemes have one or more security flaws, especially can not secure against coalition attack [31] . As mentioned earlier, coalition attack can destroy the validity and integrity of aggregated messages.
III. PRELIMINARIES A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group, G 1 's prime order is q, G 1 's generator is P. Let G 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group, its order also is q. Let Q, R ∈ G 1 and a, b ∈ Z * q . A bilinear pairing map e : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 can satisfy the following properties.
(1 Point Addition: Assume P and Q be two points of E/E p and P = Q, a line joining P and Q will intersect E/E p at a point −R. If P = Q, a line joining P and Q will be a tangent line of E/E p .
Point Subtraction: Assume P and Q be two points of E/E p and Q = −p, the two point subtraction is express as P + Q = P − P = , i.e. the line joining P and Q will intersect E/E p at a infinite point Scalar Point Multiplication: Assume P be a point of E/E p , m point P's addition is defined as scalar multiplication, i.e. m · P = P + P + · · · + P(mtimes), where, m ∈ Z p , m > 0. Order of group: Assume n > 0, m ∈ Z p , we call n is the order of group G p if n is smallest number that makes n · P = ,
C. COMPLEXITY ASSUMPTIONS
In this subsection, the computational hard problems related to ECC is described as follows.
Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP): Given two random point P, Q ∈ E/E p , Q = α · P, to calculate α from Q for unknown α ∈ R Z * p . The probability for a probabilistic-polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A to solve the ECDLP problem is Adv ECDLP
The hardness is that the Adv ECDLP A to solve the ECDLP problem is negligible in polynomial time.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL AND SECURITY MODEL A. SYSTEM MODEL
The system model of our healthcare wireless sensor network adopts the model that proposed in [6] and [31] .The system model provides authentication, integrity and privacy protection, and eliminates the chance of false data transmission. Therefore, the system model consists of four entities, i.e. sensor nodes (SNs), medical severs (MS), designated doctors (DDs) and data aggregator (DA), as shown in Fig. 2 . For ease of security management, different disease sensory data belong to different MS, such as all the data of heart pulse rate must come from one MS.
• Sensor nodes(SNs): SNs are small devices attached to the patients, which are limited in power and computation. Assume each sensor node has its identical identity ID i , and its public key pair embedded in its chip. Assume its private key ppk i and public key PPK i = ppk i · P are distributed by MS.
• Designated doctors (DDs): DDs are authorized healthcare doctors that can obtain the sensing data from MS, then provide appropriate prescription for a patient after analyzing his/her data.
• Medical server (MS): MS is assumed to have a powerful computing ability and storage space, and can handle a large amount of data received by sensor nodes. Once finishing the data processing, MS transmits the patient's data to his/her DD. MS takes charge of system initialization, generates its private key α and public key MS pub . MS's another task is to generate partial-private key for each SN and send it to SN in a secure channel.
• Data aggregator (DA): DA is assumed to be one role that takes charge of collecting and verifying sensing data from SNs, then generating an aggregate signature and sending it to MS.
The sensory data are the core of various of services based on HWSNs. Generally speaking, the data in HWSNs includes the sensing data and state information. To protect data integrity and authentication, sensing data must be signed. The data that have been signed by sensor nodes can be divided into two type in term of signature: one is valid data that their signature can pass verification, the other is invalid that their signature cannot pass verification.
In our HWSNs, the data flow from data generation to storage can be illustrated as follows: Sensor nodes periodically collect sensory data, then add state information to the data, then make a signature on the data. Next, sensor nodes send the signed message to the Data aggregator. Upon receiving messages from sensor nodes, cluster nodes verify and aggregate the signatures, then send the aggregated message to MS. The typical structure of healthcare wireless sensor network is illustrated in Fig.2 .
B. SECURITY REQUIREMENT AND SECURITY MODEL
In this section, the security requirements of HMSNs and the CLAS adversary model for HMSNs are analyzed.
1) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
It is well known that the security and privacy of HMSNs user is crucial. According to the system model of HMSNs and the recent research efforts, the security requirements of HMSNs are listed as follows. 1) Anonymity: To protect the privacy of the HMSNs user, no one can extract the privacy of the HMSNs user according the intercepted messages, except MS.
2) Mutual Authentication: A HMSNs user and other entities in HMSNs should be able to mutually authenticate each other. It is very important to protect user privacy and avoid potential attacks.
3) Un-Linkability: The malicious one or the adversary can not link any two messages in HMSNs, even from the same user.
4) Tranceability: When the HMSNs user is in an emergency, the MS is the only one who can extract the true identity of the user by analyzing his/her message.
5) Attack Resistance:
The proposed scheme must be capable of resisting various attacks: modified attack, replay attack, forgery attacks, man-in-the-middle attack in the HMSNs, for example.
2) SECURITY MODEL
Two level attackers are existed in the certificateless public key cryptography as proposed in [12] . One is Type I adversary that can model an ''outsider'' adversary, another is Type II adversary that can model an ''insider'' and ''honest but curious'' key generator. Adversary I (called A I ) cannot obtain system master key or user partial key, but can compromise user secret value. Adversary II (called A II ) can generate the system parameters and derive user partial private key according to specification of system, such as key generation center and medical sever, but it cannot compromise user secret value.
According to [31] , the security requirements of HWSNs include integrity, authenticity, availability and flexibility, etc. In our system model, the main concern is the privacy and integrity protection for the process of data delivery to the MS, i.e. as for a message authentication in HWSNs, being secure against modification attack, data tampering attack, impersonation attack, relay attack are the main necessary security requirements.
Based on the definitions of adversary's ability and the network model of HWSNs system, the security model is defined as a game played between a challenger C and adversary A under the random oracle model for the proposed scheme, here A can be A I or A II . There are three steps in the game as following.
System Initialization: In this step, the challenger C will generate the public parameters and the private key of the system. Then C sends the pubic parameters to the adversary A.
Oracle-Query: In this step, A makes h-oracle, Create − User, Replace − Public − Key, Extract − Secret − Value, Extract − Partial − Key and Sign oracle queries in different times and in any order, C according to the rules of game.
Output: In this step, C makes a forged signature according oracle queries, and the advantage of C be analyzed.
In this game, A could break the signature scheme only if it can forge a valid request message. Assume Adv Sign (A) is the probability that A can break the signature scheme in this game. Definition 1: A signature scheme for HWSN can be determined to be secure if the probability Adv Sign (A) is negligible for any PPT adversary A.
V. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF Kumar et al.'s CLAS FOR HWSN
For simplicity, the notations and corresponding descriptions used in this paper are listed in Table 1 .
A. REVIEW OF Kumar et al.'s CLAS
Kumar et al.'s CLAS has five algorithms. Each algorithm can be simply described as follows. Setup: MS executes this phase on the condition of security parameter k. First, MS selects a bilinear pairing e :
where G 1 and G 2 are two cyclic groups with same order q. Then MS selects α ∈ R Z * q as its master key, computes MS pub = αP as it public key. Next, MS selects hash functions as 
holds or not. If holds, the verifier accepts the signature.
Aggregate: After receives and verifies n signatures that n SNs signed on message m 1 , m 2 , ..., m n respectively, an aggregator calculates V = n i=1 V i and outputs an aggregate
Aggregate-Verify: After receives an aggregate signature σ = (R 1 , R 2 , ...R n , V ) of message (m 1 , m 2 , ..., m n ) with identity (ID 1 , ID 2 , ..., ID n ) and state information , the MS calculates i) In the initialization phase, the challenger C generates system parameters, MS's master key α and public key MS pub , then sends α and MS pub to A II .
ii) In the query phase, the adversary A II makes a query on Sign-query Oracle with (
As shown before, the adversary A II can forgery a valid signature without knowing or extract the secret value of SN ID * i . Therefore, A II can win Game II.
2) NOT PROVIDE PATIENT PRIVACY PROTECTION
Health information is the most important privacy for everybody, therefore, healthcare information cannot be exposed to others. However, the existing proposed certificateless signature schemes for HWSNs have not provide privacy protection. In the Kumar et al.'s CLAS scheme, user's identities are exposed to everyone, adversaries can track the user's identity and obtain more private data through information correlation analysis, even if the message m i is encrypted.
VI. THE IMPROVED CLAS SCHEME
In this section, we present an improved certificateless aggregate signature scheme for HWSNs by using ECC. Table 2 summarizes some new notations and corresponding descriptions used in the proposed scheme.
Next, the eight algorithms are described as following subsections.
A. SETUP(λ)
The MS runs this algorithm with input λ as follows.
i) Selects an elliptic curve E p (a, b) defined by equation a, b) and the point at infinity . Next, selects a key α ∈ Z * q as system master key, and calculates MS pub = αP as system public key.
ii) Selects six secure hash functions,
iii) At last, keeps α in secret and publics system pub-
The MS runs this algorithm by inputing system parameters paras, master key α, and SN's real identity ID i . The output is the SN's partial private key ppk ID i as follows.
, and sends it to the SN ID i in a secure channel.
iii
C. PRIVATE-KEY-GEN(paras, ID)
Each sensor node runs this algorithm by inputing system parameters paras and SN's ID i . The algorithm selects x i ∈ Z * q , computes X i = x i · P. At last it keeps the secrete value x i in secret, and declares its public key PK i = (PPK i , X i ). 
ii) Checks verification equation Eq.(1) holds or not.
iii) If Eq. (1) holds, the algorithm returns true. Else, it returns false.
, the correctness of verification equation (1) can be proved as the following.
Therefore, the verification equation Eq. (1) is correct.
F. AGGREGATION(paras, ID, PK , m, δ)
The signature aggregator runs the algorithm after having run Verify(paras, ID, PK , m) and obtaining ''true'' result. It aggregates n signatures by following steps. i) Assume n messages be (m 1 ,
To save communication cost and computation cost for later delivering and verification, it computes ρ = h 5 (h 3 1 
, , v} as an aggregate signature for the n messages.
G. AGGREGATION-VERI(paras, ID, PK , m, δ)
The MS runs the algorithm to verify a aggregate signature for n messages. The detailed steps are shown as follows.
ii) Checks verification equation Eq.(2) holds or not.
iii) If Eq.(2) holds, the algorithm returns true. Else, it returns false.
Because
, the correctness of verification equation (2) can be proved as the following.
Therefore, the verification equation Eq.(2) is correct.
H. KEY-RENEW(paras, ID)
The MS and SN (ID i ) execute the Key-renew algorithm together. The detailed steps are the follows. i) SN (ID i ) launches key renew request , sets m i = ''0'', then randomly selects r i ∈ Z * q , computes
as the signature on message (m i , , TID i , X i ) to the MS.
ii) The MS verifies SN (ID i )'s signature by Eq.(1). If not, the MS declines it. Else, the MS computes RID i = PID i ⊕ h 1 (α·U i , T i ), then checks whether RID i exists in the database. If not, the MS declines it. Else, the MS randomly selects u i ∈ Z * q , computes
At last, the MS sends TID i , ξ i to SN (ID i ).
iii) SN (ID i ) computes h 6i = h 6 (r i ·M S pub ), ppk i = ξ i ⊕h 6i , then checks whether ppk i · P = U i + h 2i · M S pub , if holds, SN (ID i ) sets ppk i as its new partial private key, and randomly selects x i ∈ Z * q , computes X i = x i · P as its new public key.
VII. SECURITY PROOF AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the formal security proof that the proposed scheme (iCLAS) is unforgeable against adversary I and adversary II as described in Section 4.2, then we demonstrate that iCLAS can satisfy the security requirements of HWSNs system.
A. SECURITY PROOF
In this subsection, iCLAS is assessed on the security under the random oracle model. Theorem 1: Assume there is a polynomial-time adversary A I who can win Game I with non-negligible probability, therefore must exist a challenger C who can solve the ECDLP problem with advantage Proof: Assume A I be a type I adversary, it ties to forge target node ID o 's signature, and it can win Game I with probability ε. Give a ECDLP instance as (G, P, Q = αP). Let C be a challenger, and it can run A I as a subroutine to solve ECDLP instance.
Step 1: C initials system, then sends the system parameters to A I . Assume C is given an ECDLP instance (G, P, Q = MS pub ), which is to compute α from MS pub .
Step 2: A I makes Oracle queries in polynomial times and receives the answers form C as following sub-steps.
• Hash-queries. When A I makes such queries, C responds as follows. • Create-User(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C checks user-list L u . If there exists an entry with ID, C returns TK ID . Otherwise, C randomly selects x ID , u ID , h1 ID ∈ Z q * , and computes
• Replace-Public-Key(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C randomly selects x ∈ Z * q and computes PK ID = x · P, At last adds (x, PK ID ) in L u and returns it to A I . As for ppk, C returns ⊥.
• Extract-Secret-Value(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C checks user-list L u . If there exists an entry with ID, C returns x to A I .
• Extract-Partial-Key(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C checks user-list L u . If ID = ID o , C returns ⊥. Else if there exists an entry with ID, C returns ppk to A I , else C executes Create-User(ID) query and returns ppk to A I .
• Sign (ID, m) . Once receives this query on (ID, m), C checks whether there exists an entry with tuple (ID) in
q , and computes
Step 3 
According to the forgery lemma proposed in [34] as replays the game, A I can derive another forged signature
From the Eq. (3) and Eq. (4), we can obtains the α =
That is, C can solve the ECDLP instance. Now, we analyze the probability of C obtains the right solution for the Instance (P, Q = αP). If C succeeds, there are two events will happen. ·E1: Never abort the game. Proof: Assume A II be a type II adversary, it ties to forge target node ID o 's signature, and it can win Game I with probability ε. Give a ECDLP instance as (G, P, Q = x o · P). Let C be a challenger, and it can run A II as a subroutine to solve ECDLP instance.
Step 1: C initials system, and sets MS pub = α ·P, then sends the system parameters and α to A II . Assume C is given an ECDLP instance, which is find a way to solve x o from Q.
Step 2: A II makes Oracle queries in polynomial times and receives the answers form C as following sub-steps.
• Hash-queries. When A II makes these queries, C responds as follows. • Create-User(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C checks user-list L u . If there exists an entry with ID, C returns TK ID . Else, if ID = ID o , C randomly selects u ∈ Z q * , X ∈ G and T , and computes U = u · P, PID = ID ⊕ h 1 (αu · P, T ), h 2 = h 2 (TID, MS pub ), ppk = u + αh 2 mod q, x = ⊥. Next, C adds the item (ID, u, ppk, x, h 2 ) to corresponding list L u , L h2 respectively. If ID = ID o , C randomly selects u, x ∈ Z q * and T , and computes U = u·P, PID = ID⊕h 1 (αu·P, T ),
• Replace-Public-Key(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C answers according to two situations. If ID = ID o , C answers according to the original Partial-Key-Generation and Private-key-Generation algorithm.
• Extract-Secret-Value(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C checks User List L u . If there exists an entry with ID, C returns x to A II . Otherwise, if ID = ID o , C selects x ∈ Z * q as ID's secret value and adds to L u , then returns x to A II . If ID = ID o , C return ⊥.
• Extract-Partial-Key(ID). Once receives this query on (ID), C checks L u . If there exists, C returns ppk to A II . Else, C executes Create-User(ID) query and returns ppk to A II .
According to the forgery lemma proposed in [34] as replay the game, A II can derive another forged signature
From the Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), we can obtains the
]. The probability of E1's occurrence can be analyzed during Create-user Oracle Query, Extract-Partialkey Oracle Query,Sign Oracle Query in the game. Then we can get
. Therefore, we can get ε 2 ≥
As the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the proposed scheme can be secure against the two type adversary under the ECDLP assumption holds.
B. OTHER SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this subsection, the security requirements are analyzed on the basis of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
• Message authentication: When receives a message (m i , R i , v i , , TID i , X i ), the cluster node can check its validity and integrity according to Eq.(1). If Eq. (1) holds, it proves the signature of the message is valid according to Theorem 1 and 2. Therefore, iCLAS can satisfy the security requirement of message authentication for HWSNs.
• Modification attack: If a adversary has modified the message
true. Therefore, iCLAS is secure against modification attack.
• Impersonation attack: In iCLAS, when an adversary impersonates a sensor node to send a message (m * i , R * i , v * i , , TID i , X i ) to the verifier. According to Theorem 1, the advantage of the forged message
can pass the verification equation Eq.(1) can be negligible. Therefore, iCLAS is secure against impersonation attack.
• Relay attack: As definition of the system model, the sensor nodes add the current time into m i when they generate the health data. If an adversary relay an outdated message (m * i , R i , v i , , TID i , X i ) with modified time in m * i , the message with modified time can not meet verification equation
S pub according to the above security proof. Therefore, iCLAS is secure against relay attack.
• Identity tracking attack: Pseudonym is adopted in iCLAS, pseudonym is defined as
An adversary can know U i and MS pub , but it can not compute αu i · P under the ECDLP assumption holds. Therefore, the proposed iCLAS can achieve identity hiding and privacy protection.
• Coalition attack: If an adversary modifies the aggregate signature with one invalid message (
, , v) instead of one valid message, it is impossible to make the same ρ according to h 5 's collision resistance. That is, the modified aggregate signature cannot satisfy the aggregation verification equation Eq.(2). As the adversary modifies two or more invalid messages, they are impossible to make the same ρ according to h 5 's collision resistance. Through the above security proof, we can draw a conclusion that the aggregate signature is valid only on the condition that each individual signature is valid. That is the proposed scheme can resist coalition attack.
VIII. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we present the performance comparison among the proposed CLAS scheme (called iCLAS) and Kumar et al most recently proposed scheme (K-CLAS for short) in term of computation cost and communication cost.
To evaluate performance fairly and objectively, we construct the two CLAS schemes on the security level of 80 bits. As K-CLAS uses bilinear pairing, we construct its cryptographic operations as following: A bilinear pairingê : G 0 × G 0 → G 1 . G 0 is an additive group,P is its generated point on a super-singular elliptic curveÊ : y 2 = x 3 + x modp,q is it order.p is a 512-bit prime-number,q = 2 159 + 2 17 + 1 is a 160-bit Solinas-prime-number. As iCLAS is ECC-based authentication scheme, we construct its cryptographic operations as following: G is an additive group on a non-singular elliptic curve E : y 2 = x 3 + ax + b mod p, its generated point is P, its order is q, where a, b ∈ Z * q and p, q are two 160-bit prime number. We implement the corresponding cryptographic operations on the following environments: hardware is formed by an Intel-i3 3110M processor, clock frequency is 2.40 GHz, and memory is 4 GB, operation system is windows 7. The execution times of these cryptographic operations are shown in Table 3 . The names of cryptographic operations is abbreviated as column Abbr. in Table 3 .
According to the definitions of these cryptographic operations, the size ofp is 64 bytes and p is 20 bytes. Therefore, the element in G 0 is 128 bytes and the element in G is 40 bytes. We define the sizes of an identity of node and a oneway hash function result as 10 bytes and 20 bytes respectively.
A. COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON
In this subsection, the proposed iCLAS scheme is compared with Kummar et al's K-CLAS scheme in terms of computation cost in the Sign, Verify, Aggregate and Aggregate-Verify algorithm.
As far as Kummar et al's K-CLAS, the computation cost in Sign algorithm consists of three scalar multiplication operations and two point addition operations related to the bilinear pairing, one Map-To-Point function operation and one oneway hash function operation, therefore the total execution time of Sign algorithm is 3T PM + 2T PA + 1T H + 1T h ; the computation cost in Verify algorithm consists of three pairing operations, one scalar multiplication operation and one point addition operation related to the bilinear pairing, one MapTo-Point function operation and one one-way hash function operation, therefore the total execution time of Verify algorithm is 3T BP + 1T PM + 1T PA + 1T H + 1T h ; the computation cost for n messages in Aggregate algorithm consists of n − 1 pairing operations, therefore the total execution time of Aggregate algorithm is (n − 1)T BP ; the computation cost for n messages in Aggregate-Verify algorithm consists of 3n pairing operations, n scalar multiplication operations and 2n − 1 point addition operations related to the bilinear pairing, n MapToPoint function operations, and n one-way hash function operations, therefore the total execution time of Aggregate-Verify algorithm is 3T BP + nT PM + 2(n − 1)T PA + nT H + nT h .
As far as iCLAS, the computation cost in Sign algorithm consists of one scalar multiplication operation related to the ECC and three one-way hash function operations, therefore the total execution time of Sign algorithm is 1T EM + 2T h ; the computation cost in Verify algorithm also consists of four scalar multiplication operations and three point addition operations related to the ECC, three one-way hash function operations, therefore the total execution time of Verify algorithm is 4T EM + 3T EA + 3T h ; the computation cost for n messages in Aggregate algorithm consists of constant addition and subtraction, and one one-way hash function operation, especial tips the scalar multiplication and point addition operations has be computed in verification, therefore, the total execution time of Aggregate algorithm is 1T h ; the computation cost for n messages in Aggregate-Verify algorithm consists of (3n+1) scalar multiplication operations and 3n point addition operations related to the ECC, 3n one-way hash function operations, therefore the total execution time of AggregateVerify algorithm is (3n
The total execution time of the four algorithm in iCLAS and K-CLAS can be calculated according to Table 3 . The results are shown in Table 4 .
As shown in Table 4 , the computation cost time of Sign algorithm and Verify algorithm in K-CLAS are 9.289 ms and 23.236 ms. However, the computation cost time of iCLAS in IKP and MSP are 0.754 ms and 3.028 ms, which can decrease by 91% and 87% when compared with the time of K-CLAS. The Fig. 3 can vividly show that our proposed iCLAS takes a large advantage on computation cost over K-CLAS scheme in the Sign algorithm and Verify algorithm.
The computation cost comparisons in Aggregate algorithm (aggregating 50 messages) and Aggregate-Veri algorithm (verifying aggregate signature with 50 messages) are illustrated in Fig. 4 , which also shows that our proposed iCLAS takes a large advantage on computation cost over K-CLAS scheme.
The Fig. 5 demonstrates the computation costs of Aggregate algorithm and Aggregate-Veri algorithm for different number of messages of iCLAS and K-CLAS. Where, Aggregate algorithm of K-CLAS demonstrates the computation cost for aggregating different number of messages in K-CLAS scheme, Aggregate-veri algorithm of K-CLAS demonstrates the computation cost for the MS to verify different number of messages in K-CLAS scheme, Aggregate algorithm of iCLAS demonstrates the computation cost for aggregating different number of messages in iCLAS scheme, Aggregate-veri algorithm of iCLAS demonstrates the computation cost for the MS to verify different number of messages in iCLAS scheme. As results shown in Fig. 5 , iCLAS scheme is more efficient than K-CLAS scheme regardless of the number of messages.
In summary, compared with K-CLAS scheme, iCLAS scheme has much lower computation cost in Sign, Verify, Aggregate and Aggregate-Verify algorithm than K-CLAS scheme.
B. COMMUNICATION COST COMPARISON
Next, the communication cost is analyzed between iCLAS and K-CALS in this subsection.
According the previous analysis, the sizes ofp, p, G 0 , G and one-way hash function result have been defined as 64, 20, 128, 40 and 20 bytes respectively. We define the sizes of security parameter λ as 20 bytes, i.e. an identity of node and a one-way hash function result are 20 bytes. For simplicity, the data in messages is not considered in the communication cost comparison because it is the same to every scheme. 
1) AS FAR AS iCLAS
The message sent by sensor node to verifier consists of {m i , , TID i = (U i , PID i , T i ), X i , σ i = (R i , v i )}, which includes three elements in G, i.e. (U i , X i , R i ∈ G, 40×3 bytes) and four elements are 20 bytes, i.e. ( , PID i , T i , v i , 20×4 bytes), therefore, the size of message is 200 bytes; The aggregate message (Assume aggregate n messages) sent by verifier to the MS consists of
, , v}, which includes 3n elements in G ( 40×3n bytes), 2n + 2 elements are 20 bytes (20×(2n + 2) bytes). Therefore, the size of aggregate message is 160 × n + 40 bytes.
2) AS FAR AS K-CLAS
The message sent by sensor node to verifier consists of {m i , ID i , , PK ID i , σ i = (R i , V i )}, which includes three elements in G 0 (PK i , R i , V i ∈ G 0 , 128×3 bytes) and two elements are 20 bytes, i.e. ( , ID i , 20×2 bytes) , therefore, the size of message is 424 bytes; The aggregated message (Assume aggregate n messages) sent by verifier to the data center consists of {{m i , I D i , PK I D i , R i } n 1 , , V i )}, which includes 2n + 1 elements in G 0 (128×(2n + 1) bytes), n + 1 elements are 20 bytes (20× (n + 1) bytes). Therefore, the size of aggregated message is 276 × n + 148 bytes. Table 5 shows the communication cost comparison results of a message sent by a sensor node to a verifier and a aggregate message (50 messages are aggregated) sent by a verifier to the Media Server (MS). In the former process, iCLAS scheme has decreased by 52.8% when compared with K-CLAS. In addition, iCLAS scheme has decreased by 42.8% communication cost for verifying aggregate signature of 50 messages when compared with K-CLAS during the later process.
The communication cost of verifier to MS for the different number of messages in the two schemes (iCLAS and K-CLAS) is illustrated in Fig. 6 as the number n changes. It vividly shows that iCLAS has obvious advantages than K-CLAS in decreasing communication cost.
As a result, iCLAS scheme incurs much lower computation and communication cost than K-CLAS, and is more suitable for the HWSNs environment.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we review Kumar et al.'s CLAS scheme for HMSNs and then demonstrate the deficiencies of their scheme. Aimed to decrease the energy consumption and ensure data secure during data transmission, we propose an improved certificateless aggregation signature scheme for HWSNs based on the analysis of the existing message authentication scheme. The proposed iCLAS scheme constructs signature aggregation using ECC, and it decreases the computation costs in Sign algorithm, Verify algorithm, Aggregation algorithm and Aggregation-Veri algorithm because no using any complex bilinear pairing operation, which is very suitable for resource-restricted HWSNs environment. The security proof and analysis show that our proposed iCLAS scheme meets the security requirements for HWSNs, and is secure against forgery attack, identity tracing and other security attacks. The performance comparison demonstrates iCLAS has clear advantages in term of computation cost and communication cost when compared with similar CLAS scheme for HWSNs.
Although iCLAS is more efficient and secure than similar schemes, a lightweight signature scheme is more favored. Therefore, to design a secure lightweight signature aggregation scheme for HWSNs is our next work.
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